Battle of Toulon (1744)

The naval Battle of Toulon or Battle of Cape Sicié took place on 22 February 1744 in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Toulon, France. A combined Franco-Spanish fleet fought off Britain's Mediterranean fleet. The French fleet, officially at peace with Great Britain, only joined the fighting late, when it was clear that the greatly outnumbered Spanish fleet had gained the advantage over its foe. With the French intervention, the British fleet was forced to withdraw.^[9]

In Britain the battle was regarded as the most mortifying defeat;^[10][11] the Franco-Spanish fleet successfully ended the British blockade^[12] and inflicted considerably more damage to the British than they received, causing the British to withdraw to Minorca in need of heavy repairs. The retreat of Admiral Mathews' fleet left the Mediterranean Sea temporarily under Spanish control, allowing the opposite navy to deliver troops and supplies to the Spanish army in Italy, decisively swinging the war there in their favour.^[13][14]

Thomas Mathews, was tried by court-martial in 1746, on charges of having brought the fleet into action in a disorganised manner, of having fled the enemy, and of having failed to bring the enemy to action when the conditions were advantageous.^[8] He was, among seven ship captains,^[15] dismissed from service.^[8]

In English-language literature the battle is viewed as indecisive at best^[16][17] and a fiasco at worst.^[18]

Engagement

The outbreak of war with Spain and the imminent threat of war with France during the early stages of the War of the Austrian Succession led to Mathews' return to active service after seven years of effective retirement, with a promotion directly to vice-admiral of the red on 13 March 1741.^[19] He was given a command in the Mediterranean, and made plenipotentiary to Charles Emmanuel III, king of Sardinia, and the other courts of Italy.^[19] The appointment was somewhat unexpected, Mathews was not especially distinguished, and had not served in the navy for a number of years.^[19] His second in command in the Mediterranean was Rear-Admiral Richard Lestock, a man Mathews knew from his time as commissioner at Chatham, when Lestock had commanded the guardships stationed in the Medway.^[19] The two had not been on good terms, and on receiving the Mediterranean posting, Mathews requested that Lestock be recalled, a request the Admiralty declined to act upon.^[19]

The two men continued their disagreements during their time in the Mediterranean, though Mathews' continued distractions with diplomatic duties meant that they did not break out into an open argument.^[19] In 1742 Mathews sent a small squadron to Naples to compel King Charles, later the King of Spain, to remain neutral. It was commanded by Commodore William Martin, who refused to enter into negotiations, and gave the king half an hour in which to return an answer. The Neapolitans were forced to agree to the British demands.^[20]

In June 1742 a squadron of Spanish galleys, which had taken refuge in the Bay of Saint Tropez, was burnt by the fire ships of Mathews' fleet. In the meantime a Spanish squadron had taken refuge in Toulon, and was watched by the British fleet from Hyeres. On 21 February 1744 (N.S., 10 February O.S.) the Spaniards put to sea in company with a French force.^[19] Mathews, who had now returned to his flagship, followed, and an engagement took place on the 22 and 23 February.^[19]

The fleets had become scattered in the light winds as they approached, and as they began to form up for the battle on 22 February, Mathews signalled for the formation of the line of battle.^[8] The line had still not been formed as night fell, leading Mathews to hoist the signal to come to, intending for his ships to first finish forming the line.^[8] The van and centre squadrons did so, but Lestock commanding the rear obeyed the order to come to, without having formed the line. By daybreak on 21 February, the rear of the British fleet was separated by a considerable distance from the van and centre.^[8] Mathews signalled for Lestock to make more sail, reluctant to start the attack with his ships still disorganised, but the slowness of Lestock to respond caused the Franco-Spanish force to start to slip away to the south.^[8] Mathews feared that they would escape him, and pass through the Straits of Gibraltar to join the French force gathered at Brest for the planned invasion of Britain.^[8]

Knowing that his duty was to attack, Mathews hoisted the signal to engage the enemy aboard his flagship HMS Namur, and at one o'clock left the line to attack the Spanish rear, followed by Captain James Cornewall aboard HMS Marlborough.^[8] In doing so, the signal to form the line of battle was left flying. The two signals flying simultaneously created confusion, though a number of British commanders, including Captain Edward Hawke, followed Mathews' example.^[8] Heavily outnumbered and unsupported, with his other commanders either too uncertain, or in the case of Lestock, possibly pleased to see Mathews in difficulty and unwilling to help him, Namur and Marlborough managed to successfully engage their opposite numbers in the enemy line, but suffered considerable damage.^[8] At the rear of the ships being attacked, five more Spanish ships followed, at some distance due to the slow speed of the one ahead: Brillante, San Fernando, Halcon, Soberbio and Santa Isabel. There was some exchange of fire between these and the lead ships of the English rear. Most of Lestock´s ships in the rear remained inactive during the battle. The main action was being fought around Real Felipe, Navarro´s flagship. Marlborough purposefully crossed the Spanish line, but suffered so severe damage that she was deemed to be on the verge of sinking. The Hercules, astern of the Real Felipe, vigorously fought off three English ships, while the Constante, immediately ahead of the flagship, repelled the attack of an English ship-of-the-line, which was promptly replaced by two more, with whom she continued to fight for nearly three hours. The French ships came about at 5 o'clock to aid the Spanish, a manoeuvre interpreted by some of the British commanders to be an attempt to double the British line and surround them.^[8] With no orders from Mathews and a lack of clear instructions or command structure, the British line broke, and began to flee to the northwest.^[8] The Spanish, still on the defensive, neglected to capture the defenceless Marlborough, though they did retake the Poder, which had previously surrendered to the British.^[8] The Franco-Spanish fleet then resumed their flight to the southwest, and it was not until 23 February that the British were able to regroup and resume the pursuit. They caught up with the enemy fleet again, which was hampered by towing damaged ships, and the unmanouvrable Poder was abandoned and scuttled by the French.^[2] By now the British had closed to within a few miles of the enemy fleet but Mathews again signalled for the fleet to come to. The following day, 24 February, the Franco-Spanish fleet was almost out of sight, and Mathews returned to Hyeres, and sailed from there to Port Mahon, where he arrived in early March.^[8]

Enquiry and dismissal

The failure of the British fleet to bring a decisive action against a foe of such an inferior number had significant consequences. The opposing fleet was able to deliver troops and supplies to the Spanish army in Italy, decisively swinging the war there in their favour.^[8] This was widely remarked on back in Britain. The House of Commons petitioned King George II for a public enquiry, and a dozen captains were tried by court-martial and cashiered.^[8] Lestock was also tried, but was able to place the blame on Mathews, and with the help of powerful supporters in government, was acquitted and offered further employment.^[8] Mathews was tried by court-martial in 1746, on charges of having brought the fleet into action in a disorganised manner, of having fled the enemy, and of having failed to bring the enemy to action when the conditions were advantageous.^[8] In his defence it was shown that he had fought bravely, but in June 1747 the court judged the charges were proven, and Mathews was dismissed from the service.^[8]

The court-martial was hampered by interference from politicians and civilian courts, so in 1749 Parliament amended the 1661 Articles of War to enhance the autonomy of naval courts. It also amended the section that read:

Every Captaine and all other Officers Mariners and Souldiers of every Ship Frigott or Vessell of War that shall in time of any fight or engagement withdraw or keepe backe or not come into the fight and engage and do his utmost to take fire kill and endamage the Enemy Pirate or Rebells and assist and relieve all and every of His Majesties Ships shall for such offence of cowardice or disaffection be tried and suffer paines of death or other punishment as the circumstances of the offence shall deserve and the Court martiall shall judge fitt to require "paines of death" in all such cases.^[21]

These events were followed by a French declaration of war on Britain and Hanover in March; in May came a French declaration of war on Maria Theresa and an Invasion of the Netherlands.^[11] The Spanish admiral Juan José Navarro was created Marquess of Victory after his conduct of the battle.^[22][23]

Order of battle

4 frigates^[24]
4 fire ships^[24]

Notes

References

•  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
• Wilson, Alastair / F. Callo Joseph. Who's Who in Naval History, From 1550 to the present (Kindle Edition). Taylor & Francis Publishing (2004). ISBN 978-0-415-30828-1
• R. Dull Jonathan. The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650-1815 (Studies in War, Society, and the Military. University of Nebraska Press 2009. ISBN

080321930X

• Black, Jeremy. Britain as a military power 1688 - 1815. UCL Press, 1998. ISBN 978-0-203-17355-8
• J. O. Lindsay. The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol VII. The Old Regime 1713-63. ISBN 0-521-04545-2
• Hattendorf, John: Naval policy and strategy in the Mediterranean: past, present, and future. Taylor & Francis, 2000, ISBN 0-7146-8054-0
• Clowes, W. Laird. The royal navy : a history from the earliest times to the present, Vol III. London : S. Low, Marston and company, limited (1897).

Bibliography

• Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession. Alan Sutton, 1994.
• Rodger N.A.M. Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. Penguin Books, 2006.
• Roskill, Stephen Wentworth: H. M. S. Warspite: the story of a famous battleship. Collins, 1957.
• Waldegrave Head, Frederick: The fallen Stuarts. Issue 12 of Cambridge historical essays. Prince consort prize essays. Cambridge University press, 1901.
• Laughton, J. K. (1894). "Mathews, Thomas (1676-1751)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 37. Oxford University Press.
• White, Henry: History of Great Britain and Ireland. Oxford University, 1868.
• Williams Damer Power, John: Bristol privateers and ships of war. J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd., 1930.
• Garner Thomas, Peter: Politics in eighteenth-century Wales. University of Wales Press, 1998. ISBN 0-7083-1444-9
• Crofts, Cecil H.: Britain on and Beyond the Sea - Being a Handbook to the Navy League Map of the World. Read Books, 2008. ISBN 1-4437-6614-3
• Willis, Sam: Fighting at sea in the eighteen century: the art of sailing warfare. Boydell Press, 2008. ISBN 1-84383-367-0

External links

• The 1911 Encyclopedia
• La campaña de don Juan José Navarro en el Mediterráneo y la batalla de Sicié (1742-1744)